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Abstract
This paper uses a beauty contest game to test the gender differ-
ences in strategic reasoning. Using both a non-monetary incentive
treatment and a monetary incentives treatment in China, I find there
are differences in strategic reasoning.However, the differences disap-
pear with the increase of stakes.
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1 Introduction
In Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, he wrote
“It is not a case of choosing those which , to the best of one’s judgement, are
really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks
the prettiest. We have reached the third degree, where we devote our in-
telligences anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to
be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth, and higher
degrees” (1936, p.156). Keynes draws an analogy between the stock market
and the newspaper guessing game about which face people think the other
people think is the prettiest. The beauty contest game is first tested empir-
ically by Nagel (1995). Ho et al. (1998) replicated Nagel’s study and find
most players use one to three steps of iterated reasoning. Most literature use
p-beauty contest game to study strategic reasoning. However, few research
studies gender and iterated reasoning. Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017) find
males performs more iterated reasoning than females in non-monetary incen-
tives game. When there is monetary incentives, there is no difference between
male and female in strategic sophistication. They also find gender priming
increases females’ strategic sophistication, but decreases males’ strategic so-
phistication. Dittrich and Leipold (2014) use both the beauty contest game
and the 11-20 money request game and find males do more steps of reasoning
than women. Burnham et al. (2009) find no gender difference in the beauty
contest game. O¨stling et al. (2011) find women show lower strategic reason-
ing than men in the lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game and in the
Colonel Blotto games. These studies except for Cubel and Sanchez-Pages
(2017) are not designed specifically to test the gender difference in strategic
sophistication.
Another line of literature finds gender differences in competition. Most
research find females tend to choose less competitive jobs than males (Croson
and Gneezy (2009)). Gneezy et al. (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)
find women underperform than men in competitive environment. Beauty
contest game creates a competitive environment and anyone outperforms
others can win the game.
Given the mixed evidence in the literature about gender differences in
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strategic reasoning, herein I conduct a beauty contest game with both non-
monetary incentives and monetary incentives in China. My study can shed
light on the gender differences and strategic reasoning as to the best of my
knowledge, it is the first using participants not from west industrialized coun-
tries. My results lend support to the gender differences in strategic reasoning
and males perform more steps of iterated strategic reasoning. However, the
differences disappear with the increase of stakes.
2 The experiment
The basic experiment design follows Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017). I con-
ducted eight sessions of experiment at Xi’an Jiaotong University, China. Six
sessions include students from two sections of Principles of Economics class.
The other two sessions are run in graduate courses such as environmental
economics and industrial management. The distributions of gender are sum-
marized in table 1.
I run three sessions in 2017, four sessions in June, 2019, and one session
in October 2019. The experimenter reads out the instructions to the subjects
and all questions are addressed before the experiment starts. The experiment
has two phases. The first phase has 9 rounds with no monetary incentives.
The values are p = {1, 2/3, 11/10, 1/3, 3/2, 1/5, 6/5, 1/2, 4/3}. The second
phase has 4 rounds with monetary incentives. The first two rounds have a
monetary incentive of 20 yuan. The second two rounds have a monetary
incentive of 40 yuan. I randomly pick one round from both the first two
rounds and the second two rounds to pay the subjects. Subjects fill in the
chosen numbers for each p value before they submit it. There is no feedback
during each round. In total, 298 students participate in the experiment,
among whom 93 are female and 205 are male. There are more males than




Table 1 reports the mean entries by session and gender. In the non-monetary
incentive phase and p=2/3, females’ mean entries are larger than males in
all sessions except for one. When there is monetary incentives and the prize
equals 20 yuan, three out of eight sessions have lower means for female than
male in the first round. In the second round, only one out of eight sessions
has a lower mean for female than male. When the prize equals 40 yuan, a
half sessions have lower means for female than male in the first round. A
half sessions have lower means for female than male in the second round.
The results support (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2017)’s findings that females
have lower iterative strategic reasoning in the non-monetary incentives phase.
When monetary incentives are present, females still display a lower level of
iterative strategic reasoning. However, the gender gap disappears when the
stakes increase.
Next, I pool data from all sessions. In Table 2 we see in the non-monetary
incentives treatment and p=2/3 round, the mean bid for males is 34.2 and
the mean bid for females is 37.8. The median bid for males and females
are 33.0 and 33.3, respectively. Males bid lower values than females. The
Mann-Whitney rank sum test rejects the null hypothesis that both males and
females’ bids are drawn from the same population (z = 1.998, p = 0.046).
A median test fails to reject the null that males and females have the same
median (χ2 = 1.358, p = 0.244). The cumulative distributions of males and
females’ guesses are drawn in Figure 1. I further classify males and females
into level-k type. k belongs to 1, 2, 3,∞. A level 0 player chooses randomly.
A level 1 player thinks other players choose randomly. She chooses 33.3
(50 ∗ 2/3 = 33.3). A level 2 player thinks other players are level 1 players
and choose 22.2 (33.3 ∗ 2/3 = 22.2). I find the level k by minimizing the
target (bid− (50 ∗ 2/3)k)2 (Giorgio and Rosemarie (2009)). For all p 6= 1, if
k > 1 for at least 5 out of the 8 rounds, I classify the subject as high type. If
k = 1 for at least 5 out of the 8 round, I classify the subject as low type. If
subjects do not meet the criteria, I drop them from the analysis. The type
classification by gender is summarized in table 3. We can see in total, 53 out
of 281 subjects are high type. 228 out of 281 subjects are low type. The high
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type ratio is 18.9% and the low type ratio is 81.1%. The ratios are very close
to Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017). The ratio of high types among males is
22.8% and the ratio of high types among females is 10.2%. The proportion
test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no difference (p=0.013). I find
there is a gender difference in the depth of reasoning in the non-monetary
incentives treatment. Males play more rounds of reasoning than females.
In the monetary incentives treatment, I have four rounds with p = 2/3.
The first two rounds have a monetary incentive of 20 rmb. The mean for
males are 28.9 and 28.7. The mean for females are 34.0 and 33.3. Males
choose a lower value than females. The Mann-Whitney test rejects the null
that there is no significant difference in the distribution of males and females’
bids (p=0.005 and 0.004, respectively). The median test also rejects the null
that the medians are the same for the two distributions (χ2 = 11.292, p =
0.001 and χ2 = 8.7239, p = 0.003, respectively). The last two rounds have a
monetary incentives of 40 rmb. The mean for males are 29.1 and 28.9. The
mean for females are 32.9 and 32.4. Males choose a lower value than females.
The Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the null that there is no difference in
the distribution of males and females’ bids at the 5% significance level(p =
0.052 and 0.076, respectively). The median test also fails to reject the null
that the medians are equal for the two distributions at the 5% significance
level(p= 0.133 and 0.051, respectively). In the low stake game, there is a
gender difference and males bid lower than females. When stakes increase,
the gender difference tends to decrease. The cumulative distributions for the
four rounds are from Fig.2 to Fig.5. I confirm the findings using a regression
model as below:
entryi = α + β1genderi + β2testi + β3gradei + v + ξi (1)
where entryi is subject i’s entry in the game. Genderi is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the subject is a male. Testi is subject i’s grade in the class
she is enrolled in. Gradei is the grade subject i is in. v is the session fixed
effect. α is the estimated intercept. ξi is the error term. Table 4 reports the
estimates and it supports my previous findings. Males in the non-monetary
incentive phase enter significantly lower values than females (p < 0.10). In
the monetary incentives phase, males also enter significantly lower values
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when the prize equals 20 yuan (p < 0.05). However, the entries are not
significantly different when the prize increases to 40 yuan. I summarize my
results in the following:
Result 1: In experiments without monetary incentives, there is a gender
gap in the depth of strategic reasoning. Males play more rounds of reasoning
than females. When there are monetary incentives, the gender gap still exists.
However, it disappears with the increase of stakes.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female
No money p=2/3 37.9 39.7 34.3 50.8 33.2 37.4 35.9 36.4 33.6 36.6 33 35.6 28.3 41.4 35.3 33.5
money=20 yuan 25.8 38.2 27 37.7 30.6 29.9 24.3 28 29.4 33.3 32.8 30.4 28.1 42.9 33.3 32.6
money=20 yuan 29 29.7 26.6 38.9 30.7 25.7 22.3 27.5 28.4 33.2 34.2 35.4 29.2 40.6 30.9 31.4
money=40 yuan 27.8 44.4 25.8 37.2 29.6 28.5 23.6 27.9 30.9 28.6 35.7 32.3 29.7 40.1 32.2 31.2
money=40 yuan 22.4 39.4 26.9 25.1 26.3 33.9 25.7 19.6 32.9 27.3 35.3 34.7 30.8 42.4 32.7 34.9
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Bids with no prize p=2/3
Table 2: Results by gender without monetary incentives and p=2/3
mean median S.D
males 34.2 33.0 19.2
females 37.8 33.3 16.7
Table 3: Type classification by gender
High Low TOTAL
Males 44 149 193
Females 9 79 88
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution of Bids with prize 40 yuan round 2
Next I compare the mean entries among the non-monetary incentive
phase, the monetary phase and prize equals 20 yuan, and prize equals 40
yuan. From table 1, I find when there are monetary incentives, subjects
choose lower entries on average. The average entry in the non-monetary
incentive phase is 35.3 yuan. The average entries are 30.4 yuan and 30.2
yuan when prize equals 20 yuan. The average entries are 30.3 and 30.0 when
prize equals 40 yuan. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test rejects
the null the distributions are equal between the non-monetary incentive and
the monetary incentive when prize equals 20 yuan (p = 0.000 and 0.000).
However, we fail to reject the null that the distributions are the same when
prize equals 20 yuan or 40 yuan (p = 0.1634, 0.0932, 0.9297, 0.8074). Subjects
respond to the monetary incentives by exerting more efforts.
Studies find subjects with higher cognitive abilities play dominant strate-
gies and choose smaller values in p-beauty contest game (Burnham et al.
(2009);Branasgarza et al. (2012)). To test the relationship between cognitive
ability and the level of strategic reasoning, I collect subjects’ grades in the
courses they are enrolled in as a proxy for cognitive ability. The estimates in
table 4 show that in the four rounds with monetary incentives, subjects with
higher grade in the course they are enrolled in have a significantly smaller
entry (p < 0.01). When there is no monetary incentives, grades do not have
a significant effect at the 5% significance level. I summarize the results as
follows:
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Table 4: Estimates of gender effect
no money money=20 yuan money=40 yuan
round1 round2 round1 round2
gender -4.477* -4.762** -4.498** -3.586 -2.941
(2.366) (2.223) (2.096) (2.498) (2.495)
grade -3.136 -1.534 0.361 -0.854 0.409
(2.602) (1.616) (1.946) (1.993) (2.010)
test -0.213* -0.297*** -0.463*** -0.320*** -0.475***
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.120) (0.121)
Constant 67.87*** 62.16*** 73.70*** 64.99*** 70.26***
(11.88) (10.96) (10.78) (12.41) (11.81)
group effect controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
N 293 294 294 294 294
R-squared 0.033 0.065 0.099 0.062 0.102
Notes: Dependent variable is the entry in p-beauty contest game with p=2/3.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Result 2: When there are monetary incentives, subjects with higher test
grades have significantly smaller entries in the beauty contest game.
I also use the classification such as high type and low type as the depen-
dent variable for robustness check. The high and low type for the zero stake
rounds are defined the same as before. In both the 20 yuan and 40 yuan
stake rounds, if both rounds have a k equal to 1, he/she is classified as low
type. If both rounds have k larger than 1, they are classified as high type.
Otherwise, they are dropped from analysis. The results are qualitatively the
same for gender. Males are more likely to be high type in the zero stake and
20 yuan stake game. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that males and fe-
males have the same type at the 5 % significance level in the 40 yuan round.
Moreover, the regression coefficients are not jointly significant (p = 0.23).
The test score is not significant for the strategic type.
4 Conclusion
Herein I use a beauty contest game both without and with monetary incen-
tives to test gender differences in the depth of strategic reasoning in China. I
confirm the gender gap. Males play more rounds of strategic reasoning. How-
ever, the gender gap disappears with the increase of stakes. My results are
consistent with previous findings such as Dittrich and Leipold (2014). My re-
sults are also the same as Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017) in the zero-stake
game. However, I find gender differences also in the monetary incentives
game, which is different from Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017). There is evi-
dence that stakes matter in the ultimatum game. Andersen et al. (2011) find
respondents’ rejection rates decrease to zero with the increase of stakes.
I use the subjects’ grades as a proxy for cognitive ability. I find subjects
with higher grades have significantly smaller entries in all rounds with mon-
etary incentives. This is consistent with previous findings such as Burnham
et al. (2009) and Branasgarza et al. (2012).
My study contributes to the literature on gender and strategy reasoning.
It also contributes to cognitive ability and strategic reasoning. The limitation
of the research is I didn’t ask participants to state their reasons for their
choices of entry. Studies find elicited belief may have different results than
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actual choices (Lahav (2015)). Future research can explore whether higher
stakes can eliminate the gender gap in strategic reasoning in the beauty
contest game.
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A Experimental Instructions
The instruction is adapted from Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017).
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions.
There are two phases in the experiment. The first phase is to help you get
familiar with the experiment. In the second phase, you are going to compete
with other students to win monetary awards. The participant who picks the
number closest to the target wins the awards. If two participants win, they
will split the award. Please keep silent and do not communicate with others
as this is very important to the experiment.
A.1 Part I No monetary award
Please pick a number from [0, 100].






= P ∗ average
Anyone who picks the number closet to the target wins the award.
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A.2 Part II Monetary award
Now we will have four rounds of game with monetary incentives. The first
two rounds (1, 2) have a monetary award of 20 yuan. The second two round
(3, 4) have a monetary award of 40 yuan. At last we will randomly pick one
round from (1,2 ) to pay the winner. We will randomly pick another round






p = 2/3 for each round in the phase. The winner is anyone who chooses
a number closet to the 2/3 of the average.
Is there any question?
B Survey
Please tick with the corresponding answer.
1. What’s your gender? Male Female
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2. What’s your major? Science and Engineering Business and Manage-
ment Pharmacy
3. Do you have any course in game theory besides Principles of Eco-
nomics? Yes NO
4. Your grade:
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